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This article considers several aspects of the economic decision making of the poor from the
perspective of behavioral economics, and it focuses on potential contributions from marketing. Among
other things, the authors consider some relevant facets of the social and institutional environments in
which the poor interact, and they review some behavioral patterns that are likely to arise in these
contexts. A behaviorally more informed perspective can help make sense of what might otherwise be
considered “puzzles” in the economic comportment of the poor. A behavioral analysis suggests that
substantial welfare changes could result from relatively minor policy interventions, and insightful
marketing may provide much needed help in the design of such interventions.
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T
heories about poverty typically fall into two camps.
Social scientists and regular people regard the behav-
iors of the economically disadvantaged either as calcu-
lated adaptations to prevailing circumstances or as emanat-
ing from a unique “culture of poverty” that is rife with
deviant values. The first view presumes that people are
highly rational; hold coherent, well-informed, and justified
beliefs; and pursue their goals effectively, with little error
and with no need for help. The second view attributes to the
poor various psychological and attitudinal shortcomings that
are endemic and that render their views often misguided,
their behaviors lacking, and their choices fallible, leaving
them in need of paternalistic guidance.
We are driven by a third view. We propose that the
behavioral patterns of the poor may be neither perfectly cal-
culating nor especially deviant. Rather, the poor may exhibit
basic weaknesses and biases that are similar to those of
people from other walks of life, except that in poverty, there
are narrow margins for error, and the same behaviors often
manifest themselves in more pronounced ways and can lead
to worse outcomes (see Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir
2004). According to this view, people who live in poverty
are susceptible to many of the same idiosyncrasies as those
who live in comfort, but whereas better-off people typically
find themselves, either by default or through minimal effort,
in the midst of a system composed of attractive “no-fee”
options, automatic deposits, reminders, and so forth, that is
built to shelter them from grave or repeated error, less-well-
off people often find themselves without such “aids” and
instead are confronted by obstacles—institutional, social,
and psychological—that render their economic conduct all
the more overwhelming and fallible.
Marketing plays a significant role in the current context in
which the poor find themselves, both in what it does and in
what it has failed to do. On the one hand, marketing has
been used profusely and effectively by for-profit firms and,
at least on occasion, has contributed to making the lives of
the poor even poorer. Aggressive marketing campaigns
have targeted the poor on products ranging from fast foods,
cigarettes, and alcohol to predatory mortgages, high-interest
credit cards, payday loans, rent-to-own, and various other
fringe-banking schemes (see, e.g., Caskey 1996; Mendel
2005). On the other hand, significantly less has been done to
aggressively promote more positive options, such as health-
ful diets, various not-for-profit services, union banks,
prime-rate lenders, and so forth.
One explanation for the discrepancy is in terms of market
forces: Firms offering predatory rates have more to gain
from aggressive marketing than governmental agencies or
not-for-profit companies, which have severely limited bud-
gets. Another explanation is a tendency to underappreciate
the potential impact of marketing as a “superficial” yet
highly effective intervention, even in situations in which the
product offered is indeed advantageous (and, therefore the
thinking might go, might not need the help of marketing
“gimmicks”). In light of the systematic impact of subtle,
context-dependent nuances on human behavior, there are
likely to be simple and insightful marketing manipulations
that can make a real difference in socially desirable ways.
In what follows, we illustrate the kinds of insights that
might be gained from a behaviorally more realistic analysis
of the economic conditions of the poor. The behavioral per-
spective we impose is essentially that which current empiri-
cal research in behavioral economics and decision making
provides, supplemented by insights from social and cogni-
tive psychology. We consider how social and situational
factors might interact with commonly observed behavioral
patterns, and we propose some nuanced factors that should
be taken into account in the design and implementation ofpolicies that are intended to ameliorate the economic
predicament of the poor. In this context, we highlight the
areas in which we believe simple marketing interventions
may provide a useful tool. The article proceeds as follows:
In the next section, we briefly review some important
lessons from recent behavioral research on decision making.
Then, we present a selected sample of problems and “puz-
zles” that pertain to the economic behavior of the poor. We
consider how simple behavioral considerations might help
make sense of those puzzles, and we discuss how marketing
might play a role. We list some general implications and
policy recommendations and then briefly conclude.
Psychology Background
Construal
A major development in psychological research, central to
the demise of behaviorism and the emergence of the cogni-
tive sciences, has been an appreciation of the role of “con-
strual” in mental life. People do not generate direct
responses to objective experience; rather, stimuli are men-
tally construed, interpreted, and understood (or misunder-
stood). Behavior is directed not toward actual states of the
world but toward mental representations of those states, and
those representations do not bear a one-to-one relationship
to states of the world, nor do they necessarily constitute
faithful renditions of actual conditions. As a result, many
otherwise well-intentioned social interventions can fail
because of the way they are construed by the targeted group,
for example, “as an insulting and stigmatizing exercise in
co-option and paternalism” (Ross and Nisbett 1991, p. 11)
or as an indication of what the desired behavior is or what it
might be worth. Thus, people who are rewarded for a behav-
ior that they would otherwise have found interesting and
enjoyable can come to attribute their interest in the behavior
to the reward and, consequently, view the behavior as less
attractive (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973). For example,
children who were offered a “good player award” to play
with magic markers—something they had previously done
with great relish in the absence of any extrinsic incentive—
subsequently showed little interest in the markers when they
were introduced as a classroom activity. (In contrast, chil-
dren who did not receive an award showed no decrease in
interest.)
As another example, Cialdini (2001, 2003) discusses
nuances in messages that are intended to produce socially
beneficial conduct, which can easily backfire. Cialdini
explains that there is an understandable tendency to try to
mobilize action against a problem by depicting it as regret-
tably frequent. Information campaigns proclaim that alcohol
use is intolerably high, that adolescent suicide rates are
alarming, or that rampant polluters are spoiling the environ-
ment. Although such claims may be true and well inten-
tioned, they may miss something that is critically important:
Within the intended injunctive statement “Many people are
doing this undesirable thing” lurks the powerful and under-
cutting descriptive message “Many people are doing this”;
the latter message stands to imperil the appeal intended by
the former. Critical for the success and effectiveness of pol-
icy conduct and implementation is the need to phrase mes-
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sages and devise contexts in ways that not only convey the
correct information but also generate the intended construal.
The Power of the Situation
A truism about human behavior is that it is a function of
both the person and the situation. One of the major lessons
of psychological research over the past half century is the
great power that the situation exerts, along with a persistent
tendency to underestimate that power relative to the pre-
sumed influence of personality traits. Research has docu-
mented the oftentimes shocking capacity of situational fac-
tors to influence behaviors that are typically viewed as
reflective of personal dispositions. For example, consider
the now-classic Milgram (1974) obedience studies, in which
people proved willing to administer what they believed to be
grave levels of electric shock to innocent participants, or
Darley and Batson’s (1973) Good Samaritan study, which
recruited students of a theological seminary to deliver a
practice sermon on the parable of the Good Samaritan. Half
of the seminarians were led to believe that they were run-
ning ahead of schedule, while the other half believed that
they were running late. On their way to give the talk, all par-
ticipants passed an ostensibly injured man slumped in a
doorway, coughing and groaning. The majority of those
with time to spare stopped to help, whereas among those
who were running late, a mere 10% stopped, and the
remaining 90% simply stepped over the victim and rushed
along. Despite years of ethical training, biblical reading, and
contemplation of life’s lofty goals, the contextual nuance of
a minor time constraint proved decisive to the decision to
stop and help a suffering man.
The pressures exerted by apparently trivial situational
factors can create restraining forces that are difficult to over-
come or can yield potent inducing forces that can be har-
nessed to great effect. What is so impressive is the fluidity
with which construal occurs and the sweeping picture it can
impose. Alongside the remarkably powerful impact of con-
text emerges a profound underappreciation of its effects.
The fundamental attribution error, a central construct in
modern social psychology, refers to the tendency to overes-
timate the influence of internal, personal attributes when
interpreting behavior and to underestimate the influence of
external, situational forces. As Ross and Nisbett (1991)
point out, when standard intuition holds that the primary
cause of a problem is human frailty or the particular weak-
ness of a group of individuals, social psychologists often
examine situational barriers and ways to overcome them.
Channel Factors and Tension Systems
In opposition to major interventions that prove ineffectual,
seemingly minor situational changes can have a large
impact. Kurt Lewin (1951) coined the term “channel fac-
tors,” suggesting that certain behaviors can be facilitated by
the opening up of a channel (e.g., an a priori commitment or
a small, even if reluctant, first step), whereas other behav-
iors can be blocked by the closing of a channel (e.g., the
inability to communicate easily or the failure to formulate a
simple plan). Leventhal, Singer, and Jones (1965) docu-
mented what has since become a well-known example of a
channel factor. In their study, respondents received persua-sive communications about the risks of tetanus and the value
of inoculation and were told where they could go for a
tetanus shot. Follow-up surveys showed that the communi-
cation was effective in changing beliefs and attitudes.
Nonetheless, only 3% took the step to get inoculated, com-
pared with 28% of those who received the same communi-
cation but were also given a map of the campus with the
infirmary circled and urged to decide on a particular time
and route to get there. Related findings have been reported
in studies of the utilization of public health services, in
which various attitudinal and individual differences rarely
predict who will show up at the clinic, whereas the mere dis-
tance of people from the clinic is a strong predictor (Van
Dort and Moos 1976). Consistent with this interpretation,
Koehler and Poon (2006) argue that people’s predictions of
their future behavior overweight the strength of their current
intentions and underweight situational or contextual factors
that influence the likelihood that those intentions will be
translated into action.
Another impressive illustration of a channel factor can be
observed in Asch’s (1956) conformity studies, in which par-
ticipants are led to make wildly misguided judgments that
conform to those expressed by a group of the experimenter’s
confederates. Remarkably, any dissent from unanimous
opinion, even if it is in favor of a mistaken judgment, opens
an appropriate channel, leading to an 80% reduction in par-
ticipants’ tendency to conform.
Individual psyches can be understood as “tension sys-
tems” (Lewin 1951) that are composed of coexisting pro-
clivities and impulses in which certain incentives, if they run
against substantial opposing forces, have little influence,
whereas other interventions, when the system is finely bal-
anced, can have a profound impact. In other words, large
manipulations can sometimes have negligible effects,
whereas apparently small manipulations can have a dra-
matic influence.
In what proved to be the precursors to today’s participa-
tory management and focus group techniques, a series of
studies that Kurt Lewin and his associates conducted in the
1950s focused on how entrenched patterns of behavior
could be altered by identifying and redirecting group influ-
ences (for a summary, see Lewin 1952). These studies were
predicated on the realization that in trying to change
people’s familiar ways of doing things, social pressures and
constraints emanating from their peer group often repre-
sented both the most formidable restraining forces that
needed to be overcome and the most effective inducing
forces that could be harnessed to achieve success. In various
studies designed to change entrenched behaviors, including
dietary, health, and child care practices, among others, it
was demonstrated that information introduced in the context
of small discussion groups was substantially more effective
than the same information conveyed through lectures in
control conditions. For example, one study advised rural
mothers in a maternity ward to administer cod-liver oil to
their infants. Whereas approximately 20% complied after
individual consultation with a nutritionist, compliance
climbed to 45% among those who received the same infor-
mation in the context of six-person discussion groups (for
further discussion, see Ross and Nisbett 1991). At the indi-
vidual level, the information, however persuasive, failed to
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counteract the pressures of group norms and expectations; in
contrast, the introduction of the same information in the
context of newly created groups allowed new norms to be
created, communicated, and conveyed through public sup-
port and professed intent.
Cognitive Principles
The preceding summary focuses on the behavior in a social
context of a system—the human information processing
system—that is itself rather idiosyncratic and complex.
Contrary to standard assumptions made in economics and
other social sciences, the psychological carriers of value are
gains and losses, not anticipated final states of wealth, and
people’s attitudes toward risk tend to shift from risk aver-
sion in the face of gains to risk seeking in the face of losses
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In addition, people are
highly loss averse (the loss associated with giving up a good
can be substantially greater than the utility associated with
obtaining it; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). In turn, this ten-
dency can cause a general reluctance to depart from the sta-
tus quo because things that need to be renounced loom
larger than those that are potentially gained (Knetsch 1989;
Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).
Contrary to standard assumptions of fungibility, people
compartmentalize wealth and spending into distinct budget
categories, such as savings, rent, and entertainment, and into
separate mental accounts, such as current income, assets,
and future income (Thaler 1985, 1992). Typically, people
exhibit different degrees of willingness to spend from these
accounts; for example, a person’s marginal propensity to
consume from his or her current income is very high com-
pared with, for example, his or her current assets (where
marginal propensity to consume is intermediate) or future
income (where it is low). This yields consumption patterns
that are overly dependent on current income; people are
willing to save and borrow (often at a higher interest rate) at
the same time (Ausubel 1991).
People’s tendency to focus on local decision contexts is
related also to familiar problems of procrastination, plan-
ning, and self-control. In the somewhat metaphorical par-
lance of Tom Schelling (1984), the self who, the evening
before, intends to get up and exercise early the following
morning is in conflict with the self who, early in the morn-
ing, prefers to stay in bed. Similarly, the person who, on cur-
sory inspection of his or her “open” calendar, agrees to
deliver a final project or make a payment by a specified date
often fails to anticipate the various factors that will likely
interfere between now and the deadline (for a related dis-
cussion of temporal construal and self-control, see, e.g.,
Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994; Lynch and Zauberman
2006).
As in other areas, minor contextual nuances can make a
difference. The self who wants to exercise puts the alarm
clock across the room from the self who will prefer to stay
in bed, and the self who commits to a deadline may choose
various effective devices (including self-imposed penalties
or the avoidance of distraction) to help abide by the com-
mitted date (Schelling 1984). Modern research on attitudes
has examined “implementation intentions” (Gollwitzer and
Brandstatter 1997) and the conditions under which attitudesstrongly correlate with behavior (see, e.g., Ajzen and Fish-
bein 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Fazio 1986; Zanna and
Fazio 1982; see also Verplanken and Wood 2006). It
appears that attitudes have better predictive validity in situ-
ations in which they are strongly activated and the link
between attitude and behavior is readily apparent. Whereas
the assumptions and language of economic theory often ren-
der many of the aforementioned issues peripheral, if not
irrelevant, to the conduct of policy (Ferraro, Pfeffer, and
Sutton 2005), a good exposition of policy-relevant insights
can be found in the domain of social psychology (e.g., Ross
and Nisbett 1991) and in the realm of cognitive phenomena
that are relevant to individual decision making (e.g., Kahne-
man and Tversky 2000).
Behaviors of Interest
In this section, we describe several broad issues related par-
ticularly to financial behaviors and the take-up of social pro-
grams that marketing interventions might fruitfully address.
We chose each of these issues on the basis of two criteria:
First, these are important, practical issues. Second, they rep-
resent challenges to the traditional economic views of
poverty.
Low Participation in the Financial Mainstream
Approximately 10% of all U.S. households, the great
majority of which live in poverty, are “unbanked.” These
households must rely on alternative financial institutions,
such as check cashers, to cash or process their checks. Such
alternative financial institutions typically charge very high
fees, and the households that use them do not have access to
formal borrowing instruments. Instead, they resort to
payday loans, or they borrow from friends and relatives to
make ends meet or to cover emergency spending. In addi-
tion, these households rely on a limited number of formal
savings tools, if any. The keeping of cash on hand that
comes with being unbanked has potentially serious ramifi-
cations for spending and savings, issues to which we return
subsequently.
What explains the low participation rate of the poor in the
financial mainstream? This low participation rate could be
the result of a rational choice based on a cost–benefit analy-
sis. If households have little to save, the benefits of being
banked may simply be outweighed by the financial costs of
maintaining an account, such as the minimum balance fees
that many banks require. Because few banks have branches
in disadvantaged neighborhoods, other costs that may ratio-
nally underlie the decision to be unbanked could be sheer
hassle and long traveling time. Alternatively, low participa-
tion rates may reflect various cultural factors. Some com-
mentators have argued that the poor do not have a culture of
savings and may simply prefer living one day at a time, with
little planning for the future. Along similar lines, some have
attributed to the poor a persistent culture of distrust of finan-
cial institutions and have suggested that low take-up rates
reflect a preference to stay away from banks because of such
distrust. A common theme to these accounts is their ten-
dency to explain “big” problems, such as millions of
unbanked households, through appeal to “big” factors, such
as the dearth of local banking options or a deep mistrust
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combined with a culture of living from day to day. To
explain big and serious problems, big and serious causes are
invoked, which typically suggest big and serious interven-
tions, such as relocating banks, subsidizing accounts, or
reeducating the poor and, in particular, their young.
In contrast, as we explained previously, a behavioral per-
spective suggests that even in the context of big problems,
small factors may sometimes play a decisive role. One clas-
sic “small factor” is “defaults,” which are often determined
by chance or fiat. Whereas from a normative perspective
defaults are considered largely irrelevant “starting points”
that can then be easily altered, descriptively speaking, the
status quo, bolstered by loss aversion, indecision, procrasti-
nation, or even a simple lack of attention, among other
things, has a force of its own (Samuelson and Zeckhauser
1988).
The striking power of defaults was documented in the
context of insurance decisions, when both New Jersey and
Pennsylvania introduced the option of a limited right to sue,
entitling automobile drivers to lower insurance rates. The
two states differed in what they offered consumers as the
default option: New Jersey drivers needed to acquire the full
right to sue (transaction costs were minimal: a signature),
whereas in Pennsylvania, the full right was the default,
which could be forfeited in favor of the limited alternative.
Whereas only approximately 20% of New Jersey drivers
chose to acquire the full right to sue, approximately 75% of
Pennsylvania drivers chose to retain the right (with financial
repercussions estimated at nearly $200 million; Johnson et
al. 1993). Another naturally occurring “experiment” was
recently observed in the context of Europeans’ decisions to
be potential organ donors (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). In
some European countries, drivers are organ donors by
default unless they elect not to be, whereas in other Euro-
pean countries, they are not donors by default unless they
choose to be. Observed rates of organ donors are approxi-
mately 98% in the former countries and approximately 15%
in the latter, a remarkable difference given the low transac-
tion costs and the significance of the decision.
When it comes to bank accounts, the default option is
often different for the poor than it is for those who are bet-
ter off. For example, consider the simple option of direct
deposit. A survey conducted by the American Payroll Asso-
ciation in 1998 shows that “American employees are gain-
ing confidence in direct deposit as a reliable method of pay-
ment that gives them greater control over their finances, and
that employers are recognizing direct deposit as a low-cost
employee benefit that can also save payroll processing time
and money” (American Payroll Association 2006, “Results”
section). In contrast, employers of the poor often neither
require nor propose electronic salary payments. In particu-
lar, they prefer not to offer direct deposit to hourly/nonex-
empt employees, temporary or seasonal employees, part-
time employees, union employees, and employees in remote
locations, all categories that correlate with low-paying jobs.
This creates a missed opportunity to turn checking accounts
into default alternatives for those needy people whose de
facto default consists of taking a check, often after hours, to
a place where it can be cashed, often at relatively high cost.
Given the aforementioned power of default options, even
among the comfortable, it seems safe to assume that defaultswould have at least as substantial of an impact on the poor,
whose options are inherently inferior and who may be less
informed about available alternatives.
Another “small,” up-front hurdle may come from the
many choices that must be contemplated, often for the first
time, when going to a bank to open an account. A prolifera-
tion of alternatives may prove confusing and menacing
without a tutorial from a helpful employee and thus may fur-
ther dissuade the unbanked person from pursuing the bank-
ing option. Contrary to standard economic assumptions, the
availability of multiple alternatives can increase decisional
conflict and reduce take-up (Botti and Iyengar 2006; Shafir,
Simonson, and Tversky 1993; Tversky and Shafir 1992). In
one study, for example, expert physicians decided about
medication for a patient with osteoarthritis. They were more
likely to decline prescribing a new medication when they
needed to choose between two new medications than when
only one new medication was available (Redelmeier and
Shafir 1995). Apparently, the difficulty in deciding between
the two medications led some physicians to recommend not
starting either. A similar pattern was documented with shop-
pers in an upscale grocery store. Tasting booths offered par-
ticipants the opportunity to taste any of 6 jams in one con-
dition or any of 24 jams in the second. Of those who stopped
to taste, 30% proceeded to purchase a jam in the 6-jam con-
dition, whereas only 3% purchased a jam in the 24-jam con-
dition (Iyengar and Lepper 2000).
In a related manipulation that was part of a larger study
(which we discuss further subsequently), Bertrand and col-
leagues (2005) conducted a field experiment in South Africa
to assess the relative importance of various subtle psycho-
logical manipulations in the decision to take up a loan offer
from a local lender. In practice, clients were sent letters that
offered large, short-term loans at randomly chosen interest
rates. Various psychological features on the offer letter were
also independently randomized, one of which was the num-
ber of sample loans displayed; the offer letters displayed
either one example of a loan size and term along with
respective monthly repayments or four examples of loan
sizes and terms along with their respective monthly repay-
ments. In contrast with standard economic prediction, there
was greater take-up under the one-example description than
under the multiple-example version. The magnitude of this
effect was large; the simpler (one example) description of
the offer had the same positive effect on take-up as dropping
the monthly interest on these loans by more than two per-
centage points. Similarly, Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman
(2004) show that employees’ participation in 401(k) plans
drop as the number of fund options proposed by their
employer increases.
Physical distance to formal financial institutions may also
fall into the “small factor” category. Indeed, even when dis-
tance, a factor often appealed to as a potentially “real” cost,
is not substantial, the slight nuisance involved may turn it
into a significant obstacle. As we mentioned previously,
studies of the utilization of public health services have
found that the distance to a medical facility can be a strong
predictor of use of facility services (Van Dort and Moos
1976). It is possible that the small, up-front hurdle of some
distance required to get to the bank prevents people from
using this service, despite what may be fairly advantageous
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and despite a cost–benefit analysis that would not otherwise
“add up.”
In addition, simple in-group/out-group perceptions, rein-
forced by advertising that is clearly intended for people of
substantially greater wealth, may help reinforce the impres-
sion that banking and the like are not intended for and
should not appeal to those of lesser means. Indeed, decisions
involving being subjected to scrutiny, interviews by an
authority, and official requests and applications are all likely
to have a nontrivial affective component. Not surprisingly,
affective states can interact with things such as risk percep-
tion and susceptibility to framing (e.g., Johnson and Tversky
1983; Keller, Lipkus, and Rimer 2003), and those who are
most vulnerable are likely to feel the weight of such senti-
ments even more than the rest. As several ethnographic
studies suggest (DeParle 2004; LeBlanc 2004), the poor
often are painfully aware of society’s norms and of their
own inability to abide by them. A single mother who, lack-
ing access to child care, needs to present herself at a bank in
the company of her small children may be aware that, ide-
ally, children are not brought into a bank. Along with a
severely limited knowledge or understanding of financial
instruments and with very little money to show for it, a poor
client may feel reluctance, shame, and a general sense that
he or she could never be an important or valued customer to
the bank.
As Anderson (1999, p. 4) writes in his remarkable book
Code of the Street,
The hard reality of the world of the street can be traced to the
profound sense of alienation from mainstream society and its
institutions felt by many poor inner-city black people, particu-
larly the young. The code of the street is actually a cultural
adaptation to a profound lack of faith in the police and the judi-
cial system—and in others who would champion one’s personal
security.
As others have summarized, there is also good reason to
assume that (1) such a feeling of alienation impedes trust,
(2) such mistrust can, in turn, cause motivation and perfor-
mance to suffer, and (3) allaying such stigmatization may
help create trust and improve motivation (Cohen and Steele
2002).
Tom Tyler and his colleagues (see Tyler 2000, and the
references therein) have conducted many studies to under-
score the role of trust in motivation. They find repeatedly
that the quality of a person’s relationship with the authori-
ties is among the strongest predictors of his or her willing-
ness to embrace the values of the organization or of society.
Perceived procedural justice plays a decisive role in a per-
son’s willingness to follow the law, vote, cooperate with the
police, and so on.
In addition, cognitive load has been shown to affect per-
formance in a great variety of tasks, from memory retrieval,
peripheral vision, and self-presentation to reliance on
stereotypes and self-control. To the extent that the poor find
themselves in situations (e.g., filling out an application at a
bank) that are somewhat unfamiliar, threatening, or stigma-
tizing (all of which can consume cognitive resources), fewer
resources will remain available to process the information
that is relevant to the decision at hand. As a result, decisions
may become even more dependent on situational cues andirrelevant considerations, as is observed, for example, in
research on “low-literate” consumers, who purportedly
experience difficulties with effort versus accuracy trade-
offs, show overdependence on peripheral cues in product
advertising and packaging, and show systematic withdrawal
(see Adkins and Ozanne 2005, and the references therein).
A behavioral perspective on the unbanked suggests sev-
eral possible interventions. In the following subsections, we
discuss some of these interventions in more detail.
Creating the “Right” Channel Factors
To increase take-up of bank accounts among the poor, the
preceding behavioral discussion suggests that much more
attention should be devoted to trying to make the task of
“meeting with the bank” an easier and more appealing one,
ideally a task that does not even involve what feels like a
“decision.” This leads to a set of possible small, low-cost
interventions that could have first-order effects on the take-
up of bank accounts among the poor.
A good illustration of the importance of creating the
“right” channel factors comes from our experience of study-
ing the First Account Program that has been implemented
by the Center of Economic Progress in the Chicago area
since the end of 2002. The goal of this program is to entice
an unbanked, lower-income population that is mostly
dependent on check cashers to open low-fee accounts at a
local bank.
To evaluate this program, we conducted a telephone sur-
vey of a random sample of people who had participated in
the financial education workshops organized by the Center
for Economic Progress. Participants in these workshops
took part in a two-hour lecture and discussion that covered
the mechanics of opening a bank account, an overview of
basic banking products, personal budgeting, and goal set-
ting. The lecture was also used as a way to introduce par-
ticipants to the First Account Program. If interested, partici-
pants could obtain a referral letter that they could take to the
bank to start the process of opening a First Account. From
this survey, we hoped to glean a better understanding of why
some participants decided to open First Accounts and others
did not.
A few interesting findings reminiscent of the importance
of small channel factors emerged from our analysis.
Although only approximately 50% of respondents reported
opening a First Account after the workshop, approximately
90% reported thinking that they would do so. We asked
those respondents who did not open an account but reported
having planned to do so, why they had not. Notably, among
those who provided an answer, a large fraction reported
some form of time mismanagement as the main cause for
their having failed to open a First Account (either they
missed the deadline and the referral letter they needed to
take to the bank had expired, or they were too busy to com-
plete the take-up process). Taken at face value, this suggests
that take-up could have been much improved had certain
small hurdles been removed.
More direct evidence of this came from a comparison of
take-up and usage of the First Accounts across two types of
workshops. In the standard workshop, as we mentioned pre-
viously, participants who were interested in opening a First
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Account received a referral letter that they could take to the
bank to complete the take-up process. In a subset of work-
shops, participants who were interested had the opportunity
to complete most of the paperwork at the workshop itself
because a bank representative was present. From an eco-
nomic perspective, there is little reason that the presence of
a bank representative should have a large effect on take-up
because it does not significantly alter the cost–benefit analy-
sis at the core of the decision of whether to open a First
Account. However, from a behavioral perspective, this
small change in implementation could have a large effect on
take-up because it reduces the likelihood that people will be
derailed by procrastination or forget about their intention to
sign up.
In practice, we found a large, positive effect on take-up
associated with the presence of a bank representative on-
site. Of course, a higher take-up may not have real effects on
behavior if people simply end up opening more accounts but
not actually using them (and/or close them very rapidly).
However, we found that the presence of a bank representa-
tive at the workshop was also associated with a higher like-
lihood of still having an account open at the time of the sur-
vey. In addition, the presence of a bank representative
on-site was positively correlated with usage of complemen-
tary services offered by the bank, such as electronic fund
transfer, direct deposits, and the usage of ATM (automated
teller machine) cards. In other words, contrary to the notion
that the unbanked are plagued by “cultural norms” or a gen-
eral distrust of banks, those who attended a workshop with
a bank representative on-site not only opened more accounts
but also used these accounts.
The channel factor literature suggests other high-impact
small changes in the marketing of bank accounts to the poor.
First, banks should be marketed to the poor in ways that are
natural and genuine. This could include public announce-
ments by figures that are identified with and trusted (e.g.,
clergy, sports figures, popular politicians). Second, simple
instructional flyers should be more widely adopted. For
example, such flyers could clearly delineate the steps to fol-
low to open an account, offer precise maps on bank location
(and perhaps bus routes to get there), and describe how to
use an ATM card.
Appealing to the Right Identities
Recent research has explored the relevance of identity
salience in people’s decision making (see, e.g., LeBoeuf and
Shafir 2005, and the references therein). People derive their
identity in large part from the social groups to which they
belong (Turner 1987). A person may alternate among dif-
ferent identities; for example, a woman might think of her-
self primarily as a mother when in the company of her chil-
dren, but she may primarily consider herself a professional
while at work. The list of possible identities is extensive,
and some identities (e.g., mother) are likely to conjure up
strikingly different values and ideals from others (e.g., chief
executive officer).
Of particular relevance here might be the natural salience
of a “poor, incapable, untrustworthy” identity that is likely
to loom in the background of any potential transaction and
could have substantially detrimental effects. Several studieshave confirmed the notion of “stereotype threat” (Steele
1997; Steele and Aronson 1995), that is, a prevalent stereo-
type about a group that creates a burden on group members
and acts as a threat. The threat arises whenever stigmatized
individuals’ behaviors run the risk of substantiating the
stereotype, and this threat can distort or disrupt the perfor-
mance of those individuals. In one study, for example, Asian
women whose race (stereotypically strong in math) was
made salient performed significantly better on a tough math-
ematics exam than when their gender (stereotypically threat-
ened in math) was rendered salient (Shih, Pittinsky, and
Ambady 1999). Several studies have shown similar effects
with African Americans, and some have replicated these
effects on people from low–socioeconomic status (SES)
backgrounds. Because students from a low SES are sub-
jected to doubts about their intellectual ability that are simi-
lar in kind to those experienced by African Americans, the
threat has similarly disruptive effects. In one study, low-
SES students performed worse than high-SES students
when the test was presented as a measure of intellectual
ability; however, the low-SES students’ performance
matched that of the high-SES students when the test was not
presented as measuring intellectual ability (Croizet and
Claire 1998).
Similar phenomena are likely to be observed in other
behavioral domains, for example, when stereotypes involv-
ing intellectual and professional ability might interfere with
a person’s willingness to interact with a bank. Adkins and
Ozanne (2005) discuss the impact of a low-literacy identity
on consumers’ behaviors and argue that when low-literacy
consumers accept the low-literacy stigma, they perceive
market interactions as more risky, engage in less extended
problem solving, limit their social exposure, and experience
greater stress.
Identities that are salient can affect behavior even when
they do not directly involve a stereotype threat. We ran pilot
surveys with 60 women at a not-for-profit company that
caters to the nonworking poor in Trenton, N.J. We asked
half of the participants some simple questions (e.g., What do
you like to do for fun? Do you have a favorite place to hang
out?) that were intended to bring out their “social” self. The
other half responded to questions that were intended to
make salient their “family” self (e.g., Who do you live with?
Which of your family members do you feel closest to?). Fol-
lowing this salience manipulation, we presented all partici-
pants with hypothetical financial choices (Would you open
a savings account that requires a $20 deposit each month? If
it were offered, would you attend a free night course on the
basics of financial management for lower-income people?).
Indeed, those whose family self was primed were more
prone to express interest in opening an account or taking a
financial literacy course than their counterparts, whose
social self was primed (p < .07).
Along similar lines, it has been suggested that one reason
for the relative success of Earned Income Tax Credit is that
it explicitly appeals to people’s identity as taxpayers rather
than as poor. Specific personality traits—for example,
people’s “regulatory” (promotion versus prevention) orien-
tation—may also fit certain decision-making contexts better
than others. Thus, Higgins (2000) and Higgins and col-
leagues (2003) argue that people value items more when
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they choose them using a strategy that fits their orientation
than when they choose them using a strategy that does not
fit. Briley and Aaker (2006) provide a related discussion of
the role of identity and construal.
All of the examples in this subsection suggest that when
it comes to bank accounts and other services intended for
the poor, government and banks should promote such ser-
vices to those identities (e.g., head of family, working tax-
payer) that might trigger a more positive response from the
intended recipients.
Improving Information Processing
Because of a limited history of banking among family and
friends, the poor may have little information about what
some of the benefits of a bank account may be. They may
also find themselves under emotional stress and cognitive
load. This suggests potentially large, positive welfare effects
from well-designed information campaigns on the benefits
of being banked. Although this may appear obvious, the
idea that the poor are operating under incomplete
information about the financial environment they face or
that they might be operating under emotional and cognitive
duress is not part of the standard economic model, which
assumes that information is easily accessible and easily
understandable.
The literature on influence and persuasion also offers
some guidance on possible best practices to increase the
efficacy of information campaigns. As we discussed previ-
ously, studies designed to alter entrenched behaviors
(involving, e.g., dietary or health practices) have found that
information presented in the context of small discussion
groups is substantially more effective than the same infor-
mation conveyed individually through lectures. Even when
the information is persuasive, when it is presented individu-
ally, it fails to counteract the pressures of group norms. Con-
versely, when such information is introduced in the context
of newly created groups, it allows new norms to be created
and communicated by public support and through declared
intent. This suggests that there are potentially large social
gains in organizing more discussion groups in less-
advantaged areas that would focus on the costs and benefits
of being banked and on how to open and manage a bank
account.
The cognitive literature also suggests ways to improve
responsiveness to the information being provided. In par-
ticular, because of the asymmetry in the perception of gains
and losses and in light of our previous discussion of con-
strual, it might be expected that a marketing frame that
stresses the losses associated with being unbanked would be
more effective than an alternative frame that stresses the
benefits associated with banking.
Consumption and Savings
The savings rate among the poor is very low. In addition,
there is some evidence showing that the poor may have dif-
ficulty in smoothing their consumption over time. This
tends to be associated with a drop in consumption toward
the end of the month and various utilities being turned off at
a high rate. What can explain such patterns? We argue that
a large part of it might be due to the psychological ramifi-cations of being unbanked. There are at least two specific
psychological consequences of having no bank account that
may affect consumption and savings patterns: (bad) defaults
and mental-accounting issues.
As we noted previously, in contrast to classical analyses,
which impute substantial planning and control, numerous
studies of middle-class savings suggest that saving works
best as a default. For example, Madrian and Shea (2001)
show that 401(k) participation is significantly higher when
an employer offers automatic enrollment; in addition, they
show that participants are likely to retain both the default
contribution rate and the default fund allocation. In a simi-
lar vein, Benartzi and Thaler (2004) document increased
savings as a result of agreeing to default deductions from
future raises. Yet the poor have little recourse to this kind of
default savings and programs. Instead, ethnographic studies
of the poor suggest drastically different forces at play, for
example, in the form of friends and family in dire straits
who frequently request help. Rather than default savings
venues, this creates situations in which spending is often the
safest way to “save.”
Notably, even in welfare policies that invest great effort
and resources to try to get the poor to save more, defaults are
often ignored. For example, many individual development
accounts programs leave it to individual participants to
invest part of their cash in savings accounts instead of insti-
tuting automatic deductions.
Because “good” defaults are less available to those with-
out bank accounts, the poor must revert to alternative and
typically expensive commitment schemes to try to save
toward big purchases. Specifically, participation in pro-
grams such as rent-to-own or layaway schemes constitutes
such alternative commitment devices. Along related lines, it
has been argued that the poor may purchase actuarially unat-
tractive lottery tickets as a saving mechanism, which leaves
them occasionally in possession of larger amounts than they
would be able to reach through regular attempts to save.
Being unbanked typically means that whatever little cash
is available is readily available. In other words, the storage
mechanisms the poor have access to are extremely fungible.
Keeping money in the form of cash rather than in the bank
may increase the desire to spend immediately, making it dif-
ficult to achieve any asset accumulation toward a larger pur-
chase. Even among the nonpoor, small (versus large)
amounts are more likely to be spent than saved. (In a study
of Israeli recipients of German restitution, on average, those
who received large windfalls spent 23%, whereas those who
received the smallest windfalls spent 200%; Landsberger
1966.) Because the poor typically deal with rather small
amounts, savings is further discouraged.
There is also evidence in support of the view of a differ-
ent propensity to consume out of different “accounts.”
Among the nonpoor, it has been shown that there is a much
lower propensity to consume out of a savings account and
that people transfer money into their savings account to save
more (Thaler 1990).
What are possible low-cost marketing-like interventions
that could help with these issues? Given our previous dis-
cussion, it is clear that a behavioral view would predict
large, positive effects on saving from the opening of bank
accounts. Such accounts should generate a “good” savings
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default to replace the “bad” money-on-hand situation. In
addition, the transfer of cash from checking to savings, for
example, can trigger the expected propensity to save more.
Bank accounts could be designed specifically to conform to
people’s mental-accounting schemes (Thaler 1999). People
could choose to label one account their “fridge account,”
another their “education account,” and yet another their “car
account.” The labeling of accounts, though nonsensical
from the perspective of standard economic assumptions of
fungibility, could help with the allocation and safekeeping
of specific funds and may provide a salient reminder of what
a person is saving toward. Indirect evidence suggests that
such nominal labeling effects can have real consequences.
For example, reports about a rise in child allowance pay-
ments in Sweden had disproportionate effects on intended
recipients’ spending on children (discussed in Thaler 1990).
Such labeling is reminiscent of other, already existing
schemes, such as education funds, Christmas clubs, or even
layaways.
Some organizations have already taken significant steps
in the aforementioned directions. For example, the State
Employees Credit Union (SECU) in North Carolina offers
an alternative to payday lending called the Salary Advance
Loan Program (SALO), which is intended to help break the
payday lending cycle. The program allows members to take
out salary-advance loans without paying the typically exor-
bitant fees and percentage rates; the loan plus the accrued
interest is repaid by an automatic debit from a SECU
account on the member’s next pay date. The program, which
is available to members whose paycheck is on direct deposit
with SECU, minimizes the application and underwriting
requirements, making the loans convenient and accessible.
In addition, and most relevant to our discussion, SECU has
implemented a SALO Cash Account, which is a pledge
against the salary-advance loan and is aimed at breaking the
payday loan cycle altogether and helping the member build
personal savings. Each time a loan is granted, 5% of the
advance is deposited into the SALO Cash Account and
accumulates interest at the prevailing passbook rate. The
cash partially securitizes the loan and initiates savings.
Similarly, Barr (2004a, p. 191) describes the impressive
achievements of Banco Popular,
[which] has made great strides in reaching the 50% of Puerto
Rican residents who are unbanked. Banco Popular’s Acceso
Popular account has a $1 monthly fee, no minimum balance,
free ATM transactions, and free electronic and telephone bill
payment. To encourage savings, Acceso Popular has a savings
“pocket” into which small sums (initially, $5 per month) are
automatically transferred from the Acceso Popular transaction
account. The savings “pocket” pays modest interest. Funds may
only be withdrawn by seeing a teller, and account holders must
pay a fee to see a teller more than once a month to discourage
withdrawals. Banco Popular opened nearly 60,000 such
accounts in 2001, with half of those activating the savings
“pocket” in their accounts.
In addition, as of fiscal year 2005, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has acquired the technical capacity to split refunds,
making it possible for refunds to be directly deposited into
more than one bank account. Not only does this allow tax
preparers to be directly paid for their services, but combined
with public and private sector efforts to bring EarnedIncome Tax Credit recipients into the banking system, it
should also allow portions of the refund to be directly
deposited into the client’s own bank accounts and other sav-
ing vehicles. Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano (2005) report
a study that encouraged eligible low-income people to open
a low-cost savings account and then direct part of their
refund to it. Their pilot study suggests that there is demand
among low-income people for a refund-splitting program
that supports asset building.
In this context, it is also interesting to consider programs
such as payroll cards; these electronically based payroll ser-
vices, which employers are increasingly adopting, allow
banked employees to deposit funds directly from their cards
to their personal accounts and allow unbanked employees to
withdraw funds through ATMs. Although payroll cards
have been lauded (and rightly so) for serving as “useful
starting points towards an increasing range of financial ser-
vices—including bill payment, savings, and bank
accounts—for low-income persons” (Barr 2004b, p. 11),
unless such cards are linked in some clever ways to alterna-
tive accounts, it is difficult to envision how they might
encourage savings.
Carefully chosen defaults and mental-accounting insights
can further strengthen the broader use of complementary
services associated with bank accounts, such as the use of
direct deposit and default deposit to savings. By eliminating
the cash-in-hand “step,” direct deposit naturally reinforces
the good default situation. On the demand side, this requires
a stronger marketing of direct deposit among the lower-
income population. On the supply side, employers of the
poor should be encouraged to provide this payment method
to their employees.
Take-Up of Welfare Programs
The poor have access to myriad transfer programs in the
United States. Yet these programs have a remarkably low
take-up rate. For example, Currie (2004) documents take-up
of a variety of programs. The poor elderly participate in
Supplemental Security Income at a 45%–60% range, which
is surprising given that it is a cash program. Similarly, Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) participation
rates are in the 50%–55% range for poor single mothers.
Smaller programs have even smaller take-up rates. For
example, State Children Health Insurance programs have
take-up rates in the 8.1%–14% range. Economists’ answer
to this puzzle has been to look for large economic costs in
an attempt to rationalize the supposed cost–benefit analysis
the poor make when they decide not to participate. One
often-cited large cost is the stigma attached to program
participation.
A behavioral perspective suggests at least three other fac-
tors that could play an important role in explaining this low
take-up. First, a critical requirement for the success of any
elective social program is that the intended beneficiaries
know and understand it. Instead, there is the problem of
rampant ignorance of program rules, benefits, and opportu-
nities. This is not only the case among the poor; surveys
show that fewer than one-fifth of investors (in stocks, bonds,
funds, and other securities) can be considered “financially
literate” (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 1998), and similar
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findings describe the understanding shown by pension plan
(mostly 401[k]) participants (Schultz 1995). Indeed, even
older beneficiaries often do not know what kind of pension,
defined benefit or defined contribution, they are set to
receive or the mix of stocks and bonds in which they are
invested. In addition, people often are unaware of the pro-
grams for which they are eligible. Thus, some have attrib-
uted the recent decline in food stamp participation to the
problem that many of those who leave TANF to go to work
remain eligible for food stamps but do not know it.
Furthermore, people may not know or may not fully
understand the relevant incentives in a given program. Lieb-
man and Zeckhauser (2004) make a compelling case along
these lines by reviewing various studies that show that
people do not know many of the incentives they face. For
example, people are poor estimators of their marginal tax
rates. Such lack of knowledge is important because it sug-
gests that incentives may work only dully. It also suggests
that mechanisms that make incentives more salient and eas-
ier to understand can prove extremely useful.
Duflo and colleagues (2005) describe a large randomized
field experiment that offers matching incentives for indi-
vidual retirement account contributions at the time of tax
preparation. Overall, they find a much larger economic
response to these matching incentives than that found in the
context of the Saver’s Credit program, which provides the
same economic incentives under the tax code. They suggest
(p. 30) that part of this differential response may be due to
the lack of transparency of incentives offered under Saver’s
Credit, for which “both the equivalent match rate and maxi-
mum eligible contribution are not easy to decipher.” They
conclude (p. 30) that “an important task for future empirical
work is to go beyond merely estimating the size of behav-
ioral responses in specific contexts and start exploring the
factors that shape the size of the behavioral response.”
A second factor that is likely to contribute significantly to
low take-up is the small hassle factors that dissuade action
(for a discussion of hassle factors in women’s failure to
undergo mammography screening, see Kahn and Luce
2006). Whereas hassle costs may appear to a classical
economist as too minor to be taken seriously, such hassles
are likely to be especially detrimental in the context of pro-
gram take-up. America’s Second Harvest documents some
such hassles in a report titled “The Red Tape Divide”
(O’Brien et al. 2001, p. 2):
The [California] food stamp application was 13 pages long, with
a complexity that would put the Internal Revenue Service to
shame. Just what is a person with limited education to make of
a question that says, “If you are a non-citizen applying for Medi-
Cal and you are not (a) LPR (an alien who is a lawful permanent
resident of the U.S.), (b) an amnesty alien with a valid and cur-
rent I-688, or (c) PRUCOL (an alien permanently residing in the
U.S. under color of law), please do not fill in the shaded box for
‘Birthplace.’”?…
In all, to complete the form an applicant must fill out more than
120 separate items. And if that applicant is nervous about mis-
understanding these almost comedically complicated questions,
he or she will hardly be comforted by a sentence above the sig-
nature line that says, “If I do not follow food stamp rules,… I
may be fined up to $250,000 and/or sent to jail/prison for 20
years.” That’s pretty threatening when one considers that buy-ing diapers or soap rather than food constitutes “not following
food stamp rules.” The California application takes hours and
hours to complete, for a benefit that averages $75 per person,
per month. That can mean hours and hours of missing work, for
a new employee who often can’t even get leave.
Finally, consider the sheet “What to Expect When You
Come in for Your Intake Appointment,” which accompa-
nied the food stamp application. It says in part:
At 7:25 A.M. Report to Window 8 to check in.
At 7:30 A.M. an orientation will begin that reviews your rights
and responsibilities.
At 7:31 A.M. you are late for this appointment, and you will be
rescheduled for another day.
Please be prepared to spend several hours (noon or longer) com-
pleting the intake process.
In the space of this document, applicants will have been
presented with information that requires higher education,
they will have been treated like potential criminals who face
a possible jail sentence, and they will have been treated like
children warned in advance about being six minutes late.
Hassles of this kind are not limited to California. The report
provides a comprehensive review of application procedures
across the country. Among its findings are the following:
•The average length of a state food stamp application is 12
pages. More than half the states (29) have applications between
10 and 36 pages.
•Thirty-eight states ask questions about sources of income that
cannot or would not ordinarily be used to determine eligibility.
•All but one state have certification statements that must be
signed (under penalty of perjury) that are written at the 9th- to
12th-grade reading level.
Such barriers to program take-up, though probably small in
an economic model, are exactly the kind of channel factors
that might greatly dissuade people.
Third, just as people procrastinate in getting regular med-
ical checkups or in signing up for 401(k) plans, the poor
may procrastinate in signing up for welfare programs. An
interesting piece of evidence that is suggestive of procrasti-
nation is the correlation between take-up and recertification.
In general, households that participate in the food stamp
program are required to recertify in person at least once
every year. However, many states require recertification
every 90 days. These states show much lower take-up rates
for food stamps (Currie and Grogger 2001). Although this
might reflect economic costs (people cannot take the days
off work to go and reregister for the program), it may also
reflect procrastination. Each recertification requirement is
one more thing the person may end up delaying and thus
may not get the program.
Procrastination may be exaggerated by the previously dis-
cussed hassle factors. It may be even stronger when people
know that even if they go to the welfare office, the chance
that they will get “all signed up” that day is low (because of
long lines and delays, forms so complicated that additional
information or help is often needed, and numerous require-
ments so that some required document is bound to be for-
gotten). Procrastination may be further enhanced by wishful
thinking. If people believe that they will soon get out of
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poverty or get a better-paying job, the cost of not applying
for a benefit today may appear low, because it will no longer
be needed tomorrow.
In principle, take-up problems could be addressed with
some marketing. Recent work (Bertrand et al. 2005) has
assessed the importance of marketing in affecting take-up.
Bertrand and colleagues (2005) conducted a large-scale
field experiment that involved large stakes and real deci-
sions. A lender in South Africa mailed out approximately
60,000 letters to incumbent clients, offering them short-term
loans at a specific, randomly chosen interest rate. Several
psychological “features” of the offer letter were also inde-
pendently randomized. The independent randomization of
interest rates along with various psychological features
allowed for a precise quantification of the monetary impact
of psychological factors in this take-up problem. The impact
of a given psychological feature on take-up can be scaled by
the impact of the interest rate on take-up, and thus the
importance of that psychological feature can be “priced.”
The psychological features to be incorporated in the letter
were chosen on the basis of prior psychological research and
ease of implementation. For example, the lender varied the
description of the offer, showing the monthly payment
either for one typical loan or for a variety of loan terms and
sizes. In all cases, it was specified that this was only a sam-
ple term and loan size and that other terms and loan sizes
were available. This particular manipulation aimed to con-
trast the economic truism that having more options is always
good with the psychological perspective that a greater num-
ber of alternatives can increase decisional conflict and over-
load decision makers. Other randomizations included
whether and how the offered interest rate compared with a
“market” benchmark, the inclusion of a photo in a corner of
the letter that differed on race and gender, the expiration
date of the offer, whether the offer included a promotional
giveaway, and whether suggested uses for the loan were
included in the offer letter. The lender also performed sev-
eral telephone calls either to remind consumers of the offer
or to prime them through suggestion (we explain this further
subsequently). Use of administrative data from the lender
allowed for the measurement of how actual take-up of the
loan corresponds with the interest rate and the various psy-
chological factors.
As economic models predict, the interest rate strongly
affects take-up. There appears to be a robust, negatively
sloping demand curve in this market. Yet some of the psy-
chological factors also strongly affect demand in ways that
are difficult to reconcile with the rational choice model. For
example, consumers are more likely to take up a loan if only
one term and size are described in the offer letter than if
many examples are provided. As another example, male
customers’ take-up increases substantially with the inclu-
sion of a woman’s photo in a corner of the offer letter.
Although not all of the psychological factors had a signifi-
cant effect on take-up, many did, and their impact was large.
On average, any one “positive” feature increased take-up by
almost as much as a one percentage point drop in the
monthly interest rate.
As a whole, these results suggest the power of marketing
nuances to affect take-up, in this case of a loan offer. We
believe that similar principles can be applied to the take-upof social programs. Other interventions might also prove
effective.
Address Time Management Problems
Several interventions might help reduce procrastination.
The simplest is a well-timed reminder, which can facilitate
take-up by drawing attention to the program. In the forego-
ing South Africa study, reminders were found to have a
large impact. An alternative to dealing with the procrastina-
tion problem is to give people a concrete deadline by which
they need to sign up. However, although this may be appeal-
ing in the abstract, deadlines can present some practical dif-
ficulties. For example, in the South Africa study, a well-
timed deadline proved difficult to determine. Deadlines that
were too short were difficult to fit into people’s schedules,
and deadlines that were too long would presumably have lit-
tle motivating effect. Likely as a result, it was found that
shorter deadlines diminished take-up. Moreover, deadlines
for social programs could prove politically costly; it can
appear as though (temporal) constraints are being imposed
on people, and the sudden unavailability of a program may
be perceived as haphazard and unjustified.
Another approach in dealing with procrastination is for
some governmental or not-for-profit agencies to explore
novel channel factors. They could contact at-risk popula-
tions, ask them whether they signed up for a particular pro-
gram, and, if not, help them complete the first steps of the
application form. These first steps may be enough to get
many people to complete the process. Such intervention
could also take place for people who are naturally about to
come off the program and thus need to be recertified.
Another important area is the design of incentives, and a
behavioral perspective suggests various insights into what
kind of temporal welfare incentives are (un)likely to moti-
vate. The TANF program provides a good example. To
motivate welfare recipients to get off welfare, the new
TANF program uses a five-year lifetime term limit. In the
economic model, such a term limit could be rationalized. If
people know that a resource is limited (only five years of eli-
gibility), they will allocate it across time wisely. This would
mean looking for a job and “saving” up the eligibility.
According to the psychological view, such a limitation
can prove exceptionally costly. As we have observed in
numerous other contexts, people are not always good at
long-term decision making. All too often, the pressures of
the moment can overwhelm long-term cost–benefit calcula-
tions. As a result, long-term incentives may have negative
consequences. People may use up much of their eligibility
before its increasing scarcity begins to exert its appropriate
weight. A psychologically more insightful intervention
might be to devise incentives that have salient short-term
costs rather than costs expected only in the long run.
Framing: “Non-Take-Up” Is a Loss
The apparent cost of procrastination may appear especially
low if it involves what is typically considered a forgone
gain. Instead, the cost of nonparticipation in a social pro-
gram could be framed as an ongoing loss rather than a for-
gone gain, thus increasing its perceived impact. For exam-
ple, the following arguments could be made: “Not getting
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food stamps takes good food away from your kids”; “by not
enrolling in food stamps, your children are being deprived
of essential nutrients”; or “every month you go without
signing up for food stamps costs your child.” Such loss-
framed messages may generate greater responsiveness than
their gain-framed alternatives (e.g., “Getting food stamps
helps you buy good food for your kids”).
In one field experiment conducted as part of a workplace
health-promotion program at a large telephone company,
women were encouraged to take mammograms (Banks et al.
1995). Women (N = 133) who had obtained fewer than 50%
of the mammograms they should have at their age were
invited to view a 15-minute videotape on breast cancer and
mammography. They were randomly assigned to two con-
ditions: Half viewed a video called “The Benefits of Mam-
mography,” which was a gain-framed presentation that
emphasized the potential benefits of getting a mammogram.
The other half viewed a video called “The Risks of Neglect-
ing Mammography,” which was a loss-framed presentation
that pointed out the potential costs borne by women who
neglect to get a mammogram. Women who viewed the gain-
or loss-framed video did not differ in their liking for the
video or in what they learned from it; these responses were
measured immediately afterward. However, 12 months
later, 66.2% of the women who viewed the loss-framed
video had obtained a mammogram, compared with 51.5% of
the women who had viewed the gain-framed version. Simi-
lar results have been replicated with larger samples, again
showing the power of the loss-framed messages to spur
behavior. In a recent intervention addressing the take-up of
flexible-spending accounts, an increased take-up was
observed under a loss compared with a gain frame
(Schwartz et al. 2006).
The framing of messages can be altered in other ways as
well. For example, framing outcomes in aggregate (yearly
income) as opposed to segregated (weekly income) formats
can have an impact, as can mere labeling (e.g., 3% mortal-
ity versus 97% survival rates). However, decision frames
are often chosen inadvertently and as if they mattered little.
If the results from other domains generalize to social pro-
gram take-up, far greater care should be taken in designing
the optimally framed message.
Improving Information Processing
Finally, attempts could be made to reduce the complexity
and increase the cooperativeness of application forms. The
first point of change could be the government itself.
Through some small investments, the government may be
able to simplify these forms so that they are easier to read
and understand. It is possible that for various political econ-
omy reasons, this is not feasible. For example, governments
may fear the ramifications of making it appear “too easy” to
get social welfare.
An alternative would be the creation of standard proce-
dures—readily available and patient consultants, software,
or other programs—that make these forms substantially eas-
ier to fill out. In other contexts, such as Medicaid, the not-
for-profit sector has been extremely successful in this activ-
ity. Such work has been especially impressive because it
allows a small amount of investment (easing of channel fac-tors) to have large returns (the transfer provided by the
social welfare program).
Policy Implications
Implication 1: Simplicity Matters
Contrary to the “irrational culture of poverty” argument,
there is evidence that the poor do respond to incentives.
However, the response to incentives may often be weaker
than it should be because the program or its incentives are
not transparent. At the time this article was written, there
was one month left before the new Medicare prescription
drug benefit program—“Part D,” the most expensive pro-
gram to be introduced in the United States in the past 30
years —began, and fewer than one in nine low-income
seniors had been approved to receive the low-income drug
subsidies. “Without such subsidies,” explains Families USA
(2005), a national organization for health care consumers,
“participation in the new drug program will be unaffordable
for those low-income seniors.” Families USA goes on to
point out that little attention “has been given to the com-
plexity of the special drug coverage and subsidies intended
for low-income seniors” and that “the complexity of the Part
D benefit is almost certainly discouraging potentially eligi-
ble low-income beneficiaries from applying.” An important
goal for governmental and not-for-profit agencies should be
to provide some of this missing transparency.
Just as there are minimum benefit rules, there should be
maximum “hassle cost” rules. Application and recertifica-
tion forms could be made substantially easier. They could be
prefilled to speed up and help demystify the process, as is
often done in the private sector in other contexts. Simplifi-
cation of public welfare program forms, such as that which
exists for tax forms and other applications for government
services, may help raise take-up. Similarly, a government
program to improve transparency of eligibility rules for dif-
ferent welfare programs seems necessary. This may include
the development of shorter, user-friendly federal application
models for state use. In the same vein, a single, and man-
ageable, form that determines eligibility for all programs (as
is already done in a few states) may be especially helpful.
In general, it is assumed that policy makers try to encour-
age participation, but there certainly are examples of local
officials actually trying to do the opposite. An important
part of any decentralization policy needs to be to guarantee
that state and local governments do not simply dissuade
take-up (and save money) through the maintenance of
numerous hassles that can have a powerfully negative
impact on potential beneficiaries, particularly the poor.
Much of this is neither new nor shocking. Part of its force
comes from the notion that the potential impact of many of
these “minor” factors is easy to underappreciate, if not to
disregard entirely. In other words, the overly complex
nature of program rules and procedures, the extensive veri-
fication requirements, the multiple office visits at limited
hours, and the frequent mandatory reporting requirements
are all not just hassles to be grappled with and overcome;
they may figure as significant factors in the eventual renun-
ciation of various beneficial programs.
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Implication 2: Persuasion Matters
It is noteworthy that whereas the private sector spends great
amounts of money and attention on marketing, government
and not-for-profit organizations typically do not. The latter
appear to be driven by the assumption that their policies and
social programs, as well intentioned and worthwhile as they
are, will work for themselves. However, much of what we
have discussed in this article suggests that this is not always
the case. Not surprisingly, even the people who present the
policies or programs to potential clients are a heterogeneous
group that differs in levels of enthusiasm, effort, and under-
standing of the relevant detail. As Duflo and colleagues
(2005) report in their experiment on incentivizing individual
retirement account contributions, the average take-up rates
and amounts contributed by clients who worked with tax
professionals who had been more successful before the
experiment were higher than those of clients who met with
historically less successful professionals.
The behavioral literature suggests that a lot of effort
should go into how the particular programs and specific pro-
gram details are crafted and then communicated to the eligi-
ble population. Even when incentives are clear, people may
not take up a program because the context is not right. We
discussed factors as diverse as the number and nature of the
alternatives (Are there too many options? Is there a natural,
and desirable, default?), how the options are described (e.g.,
as gains or losses, as injunctive or popular norms), the for-
mat of communication (situations in which small groups
may work better), and the identity that may be “right” to
trigger for the specific purpose at hand. Notably, even the
possession of stigma does not necessarily lead to decreased
self-esteem, because the stigma can be rendered impotent
through resistance and the right contextual circumstances
(Crocker, Major, and Steele 1998).
It is clear that these issues do not summarize the typical
context at the welfare office or bank. The use of persuasion
need not be confined to mass marketing; instead, it can be
implemented at the level of programmatic detail. For exam-
ple, what is the tone and structure of the brochures handed
out about the program? What is the program’s name?
Implication 3: Program Details Matter
As we discussed previously, defaults and assorted other
nuances of social policies and programs are often not
viewed as highly significant drivers of behavior. Instead,
given their potentially pivotal role, a much greater focus
should be placed on the nuanced design of policies and pro-
grams. How much initiative is expected? What are the
defaults? How are these construed by the intended clients?
Whereas nuanced considerations of this type could have a
large effect on take-up and well-being, they are mostly left
to the whims of bureaucratic administrators, who typically
(and often rightly) view themselves as responsible for other
issues.
In contrast to the intrepid sophistication on matters that
are behavioral in the private sector, it is noteworthy that
public programs often appear to be less thoughtful. For
example, welfare recipients who receive earnings benefit
transfers need a bank account into which the benefits are
deposited. However, when they move into the workforce,these people are not permitted to retain those accounts. As
Barr (2004) correctly points out, permitting the retention of
those accounts is likely to decrease the likelihood that these
new laborers will turn to check-cashing services and
increase the likelihood that they will avail themselves of
direct deposit and other services. Given the high turnover
rates of households on and off welfare, permitting families
to retain earnings benefit transfer–issued bank accounts
could be important to their financial stability and welfare.
Along these lines, governments may want to give finan-
cial incentives to private sector employers to provide direct
deposit to their employees. If there is any truth to our pre-
ceding discussion, we should expect clear, positive exter-
nalities associated with direct deposit. Similarly, direct
billing should help in the management of spending. If hav-
ing a bank account helps set good defaults, as we previously
discussed, a strong case could be made for giving banks sub-
sidies to start such low-fee accounts for the poor. Barr
(2004a, p. 224) makes a similar argument, suggesting tax
incentives for financial institutions: “[T]aking into consider-
ation research and product development, account opening
and closing costs, marketing and financial education, and
the training of bank personnel,” and “using [the] Treasury’s
analysis conducted for ETA’s [electronic transfer
accounts],” Barr estimates a tax credit of “between $20 and
$50 per account opened.”
Implication 4: Honesty Matters
A behavioral perspective has implications for what should
count as honest and, perhaps, legal. According to the ratio-
nal view, because actors are well informed and in control,
various enticements that are better avoided are considered
merely that—enticements, which will be avoided if they are
harmful enough. Similarly, information that is difficult to
find or to understand is viewed as merely a nuisance that
will be deciphered if it is deemed to be important. Instead, a
more insightful behavioral account suggests that such “nui-
sances” can be tremendous obstacles.
For example, consider the credit card market, which has
benefited from deregulation and technology that enables the
almost real-time tracking of personal financial information.
A recent report by FRONTLINE and The New York Times
documents some of the techniques the credit card industry
uses to get consumers to take on more debt. The industry
calls those who pay their full balances “deadbeats,” and it
uses creative marketing tactics to seek the “revolvers” (i.e.,
those who carry a monthly debt). Revenues come from tac-
tics that include hidden default terms, penalty fees, and
higher rates that can be triggered by just a single lapse (e.g.,
a payment that arrives even hours late; a charge that exceeds
the credit line by a few dollars; a loan from a separate cred-
itor, such as a car dealer, that renders the cardholder
“overextended”). “[Banks are] raising interest rates, adding
new fees, making the due date for your payment a holiday
or a Sunday on the hopes that maybe you’ll trip up and get
a payment in late” (Stein 2005). The average family in the
United States now owes approximately $8,000 on its credit
cards; the flurry of unexpected fees and rate hikes often
comes just when consumers can least afford them.
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Such tactics are not limited to the credit card industry.
According to Consumer Reports (2004), many bank fees are
“no-see-ums embedded in fine print or collected so seam-
lessly that consumers don’t realize they’ve paid them until
long after the fact.” As we discussed previously, various
application and recertification forms can be unfriendly and
complicated to the point of being surreal. As the Association
of Community Organizations for Reform Now (2006)
reports,
Much of the competition between lenders in the subprime indus-
try is not based on the rates or terms offered by the different
lenders, but on which lender can reach and “hook” the borrower
first. Predatory lenders employ a sophisticated combination of
“high tech” and “high touch” methods, using multiple lists and
detailed research to identify particularly susceptible borrowers
(minority, low-income, and elderly homeowner) and then mail-
ing, phoning, and even visiting the potential borrowers in their
homes to encourage them to take out a loan.
The regulation of such markets is a nontrivial proposition,
but when human frailty is recognized, such regulation is
attainable, as can be witnessed, for example, in the Federal
Trade Commission’s (2000) Funeral Rule, which lists sev-
eral procedures that all funeral homes must follow and ser-
vices they must explicitly describe and provide. “When a
loved one dies,” explains the Consumer Rights Under the
Funeral Rule brochure, “grieving family members and
friends often are confronted with dozens of decisions about
the funeral—all of which must be made quickly and often
under great emotional duress.” However, systematic human
frailty is exhibited not only when loved ones die. Recogni-
tion of such frailty suggests that ways to attain a healthy bal-
ance between libertarianism and paternalism (Sunstein and
Thaler 2003) or between free market competition and con-
sumer protection (see, e.g., Gans 2005; Sylvan 2004) should
be considered.
Behavioral Factors Matter
Human decision behavior is rich in nuance, malleable, and
context dependent. Behavioral research presents a family of
insightful phenomena and some important emergent princi-
ples. However, it does not provide an alternative account
that has the precision and closure of the classical normative
model. As a result, behavioral considerations are not easy to
incorporate into standard policy practice. This difficulty
notwithstanding, we have tried to outline some general prin-
ciples that are likely to prove useful in the design and imple-
mentation of policy, particularly with an eye toward mar-
keting techniques. Whereas the private sector spends great
amounts of money and attention on marketing, government
and not-for-profit organizations typically do not.
It is important to repeat that the general issues we raised
in this article are largely true not only about the poor but
about the comfortable and the very rich as well. However, a
rich person’s sense of procedural justice may be triggered in
the allocation of time on the golf course (apologies for the
stereotype) rather than in line for a shelter for the night, and
the impact of a framing or default manipulation on a rich
person’s allocation of investment or savings may be more
substantial monetarily, but it is unlikely to bring this person
close to the brink, as might be the case for an impoverishedcounterpart. People’s behavioral repertoire arises from an
interaction between the mental apparatus they bring, which
is confined to a remarkably impressive three-pound machine
behind the eyes and between the ears, and the contextual
influences that lead it to react in specific ways. It is com-
monly believed that people are responsible for most of their
own behavior, but research demonstrates the indisputable
and substantial influence of situational factors on human
cognition. When it comes to helping the decision-making
practices of the poor, this article suggests that greater atten-
tion should be paid to those purportedly minor situational
factors because they can make or break good decision
behavior.
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